

**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE**

THE CHALLENGE OF GHANA

**A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-GHANA BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP**

CORE COURSE 5604 ESSAY

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NWC CORE COURSE 5604, THE GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT
SEMINAR K

DR. MARVIN OTT, FACULTY SEMINAR LEADER
DR. HUGH DESANTIS, FACULTY ADVISER

“Americans and Africans alike will benefit as we continue to work for Africa’s integration into the global economy and as its vast, largely untapped market of 700 million people becomes more accessible to American exports. As America increases its share of the African market, the American jobs linked to our exports to Africa will grow far beyond the current 100,000 even as African jobs multiply and living standards are raised.” *Susan E. Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Department of State, “ Africa at the Crossroads: The Challenge for the Future.” Speech in Nairobi, Kenya, 21 November 2000.*

Context: The December 28, 2000 election of British-trained lawyer and veteran opposition leader John Agyekum Kufuor as Ghana's new president, is a seminal event in that country's modern history. Kufuor's election marks the first time since Ghana's independence from Great Britain in 1957 that an elected government succeeded an elected government. The free and fair election of President Kufuor further underscores the commitment of the highly politicized Ghanaian population and the government of Ghana (GOG) to the establishment of a constitutional democracy. Kufuor's predecessor, the enigmatic Jerry Rawlings, surprisingly in the view of some, followed the example of Presidents Senghor of Senegal, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kuanda of Zambia, who stepped aside voluntarily as their respective country's leader.

Ghana's emphasis on good governance, support for a participatory political environment, and commitment to fiscal/monetary reform over the last seventeen years, won it the acclaim of the United States, the European Union and major international financial institutions (IFIs). The success of Ghana contrasts with the crises in Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and, until recently, Nigeria. Ghana's relative success nonetheless presents a challenge to both the new Ghanaian and U.S. administrations. For the pragmatic, pro-business government of President Kufuor, the challenge is to balance the economic expectations of a patient but

expectant population against the demands of a deteriorating economy. The success of Ghana's transition to a fully constitutional democracy is by no means guaranteed, however. The new Kufuor government faces manifold economic challenges that, left unresolved, could quickly erode the current exhilaration. Kufuor acknowledged as much in his January 7 inaugural address in which he said "We face grave challenges with our economy, challenges that are likely to put severe strains on our people's belief and enthusiasm for the democratic process." [\[1\]](#)

The challenge for the new U.S. administration is to determine the importance of a democratic, economically-reform minded African countries like Ghana to U.S. National Security. The decision will determine whether over the next four years Africa is doomed to perpetual short-term crisis management or a more constructive approach. Whether or not the United States decides to engage with the majority of African nations, an enhanced relationship with Ghana makes strategic sense. Ghana is the fourth largest market for U.S. exports in sub-Saharan Africa. It is a friend of the United States and shares U.S. concerns about regional stability/security in West Africa. The government of Ghana (GOG) is also a leading force in regional diplomatic and peacekeeping initiatives and the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) is arguably the most professional and disciplined force in the region.

On the commercial front, The Kufuor administration is a vociferous proponent of

privatization and foreign investment and envisages Ghana developing into a middle-income country by 2020. Ghanaian officials support actively U.S. investments such as that of a Kentucky-based computer company that transmits scanned documents from Kentucky to Accra for conversion into data and overnight retransmission to the United States. The company currently employs 239 Ghanaians (principally women), has 115 persons in training and plans to expand to 1000 Ghanaian employees by year-end and complement of 4000 by 2004.[\[2\]](#)

The Kufuor administration is an avowed supporter of democracy and good governance. A veteran opposition figure, Kufuor sent a strong anti-corruption signal in his inaugural address. “Kufuor, who trained as a lawyer, vowed to fight corruption and try to revive Ghana’s flagging economy...’There will be zero tolerance for corruption, and I make a solemn pledge that I shall set a personal example.’ Kufuor said.”[\[3\]](#) He also considers Ghana a “natural ally” of the United States based on what the GOG perceives as mutual regional security, commercial interests and democratic values.

Interests: U.S. interests in Ghana reflect Washington’s identification of Ghana (and Senegal) to a lesser degree, and Nigeria, to a greater degree, as major regional recipients of U.S. diplomatic, commercial and military engagements in West Africa. Based on this formula, U.S. strategic interest in Ghana are three-

fold: promotion of Ghana as an example in the region and Africa of an emerging democracy; engagement with Ghana as a partner in regional humanitarian and peace-keeping operations; and identification of Ghana as a critical staging point for humanitarian and military operations.

Repeatedly cited by the Clinton administration as an example of what is right with Africa, Ghana was the “gateway” country for then President Clinton’s historic March 23-April 2, 1998 trip to Africa. The U.S. administration’s decision to launch the trip in Ghana reflected respect for Ghanaian democratization, economic reform and commitment to regional and international peacekeeping initiatives.

Democratic Interests: Ghana’s democratic government and political stability were especially important in view of the litany of regional coups, civil wars and authoritarian governments. Ironically, former Ghanaian President Rawlings’ commitment to democratization, long criticized and second-guessed by domestic and international critics, proved increasingly credible. As former President Clinton noted during his visit to Accra: “More than four decades ago, Kwame Nkrumah proposed what he called a ‘motion of destiny’ as Ghana stepped forward as a free and independent nation. Today Ghana again lights the way for Africa. Democracy is spreading. Business is growing. Trade and investment are rising. Ghana has the only African-owned company today on our New York

Stock Exchange.”^[4] (The Ashanti Gold Mines.)

Regional Stability Interests: GOG interest in regional stabilization and peacekeeping often echoed those of the U.S. Washington counts on Ghanaian participation in regional operations. For its part, the well-respected GAF conducts its regional peacekeeping efforts operations with professionalism. “Ghana has a rich peace keeping tradition beginning with deployment to the former Belgian Congo in 1960, just three years after Ghana’s independence. Ghanaian troops have a well-deserved reputation for discipline and professionalism. 80,000 Ghanaian soldiers and police have participated in peace-keeping missions in the past 40 years.”^[5] Ghana currently has peacekeeping deployments in the region -- Sierra Leone and the Congo; throughout Africa -- Angola and Western Sahara; and worldwide – East Timor, Tajikistan, Kuwait, the Balkans, and Lebanon where a Ghanaian Major General is the current UNIFIL Force Commander. Ghana also participates in the U.S.- sponsored Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Although Ghana’s ongoing participation is often subject to GOG resource constraints and GAF pique over the level of some of the training provided, Accra supports ACRI and its concept of regional peacekeeping training.

Regional Staging Interests: The ongoing crises in parts of Central and West Africa dictate the need for a safe, well-equipped staging area for launching

regional peacekeeping and humanitarian initiatives. Economic Commercial Organization of West Africa (ECOWAS) officials recently chose Ghana as a pre-deployment training site for the ECOWAS Rapid Deployment Stand-by force. The U.S. Department of Defense is also “considering formally designating Accra as an intermediate staging base for deployments into the region.” [\[6\]](#)

Prioritization of Interests: In the short-term, ongoing conflicts in the region underscore the importance of Ghana as an intermediate staging base. Ghana’s proximity to the major regional conflicts, the reputation of its armed forces, and the superiority of its facilities relative to other countries in the region, highlight this importance. In addition, the “fluid” situation in Nigeria warrants U.S. engagement with another capable and dependable entity in the region willing to work in partnership with the United States.

In the longer-term, Ghana’s ongoing support of democratization and economic prosperity, and cooperation on trans-national issues are arguably the more important U.S. interests. A stable, democratic and prosperous Ghana benefits from globalization and is a potential strong partner to the United States in the region. A prosperous Ghana also provides a growing market for U.S. exports and is more likely to support U.S.-sponsored region-specific and global trade legislation. Agreements like the U.S.-Ghana Open Skies Partnership, signed last March, “encourage the development of air services between the United States and

Ghana, one of only three sub-Saharan countries to achieve a Category I assessment from the Federal Aviation Administration.”^[7]

Initial indications are that the new U.S. administration will focus, at a minimum on mutual trade opportunities. In his January 17, 2001 Opening Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) then Secretary of State designate Powell recognized the importance of potential trade links with states such as Ghana. He spoke about the need to “maintain our outreach to Africa – and with more substance.”^[8] He also commented separately on the significance of the recently passed Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The Secretary identified the legislation as a means of fostering free trade with the continent and as a means to “begin to bring Africa into the more prosperous world of free flowing capital and open markets.”^[9]

Threats and Challenges: U.S. Strategy: The greatest threat to U.S. interests in a pro-U.S. country such as Ghana, is the formulation of an ineffective strategy that focuses on short-term engagement and crisis management. Equally damaging is a strategy that focuses on those nations undergoing military or humanitarian crises in the region and ignores potentially self-sufficient and economically viable nations like Ghana. The challenge of U.S. policy in West Africa is to avoid the “either-or” syndrome -- cultivating an enhanced relationship with *either* Nigeria, *or* Ghana, when enhanced relations with both, while recognizing U.S. priorities in

Nigeria, would make the more sense strategically.

The Economy: Any major challenge to the pro-U.S. GOG's ability to govern which promotes domestic instability in Ghana, undermines U.S. interests. The success of the Kufuor administration depends primarily on its skillful handling of the deteriorating economic situation. The Ghanaian economy, despite annual growth rates of 4.5-5 % during the last decade, saw world commodity prices for Ghana's major exports; gold and cocoa dropped precipitously in 2000.^[10] The resulting devaluation of the Ghanaian cedi prompted a major escalation in cost of living indices rendering it politically untenable potentially for the new government to implement monetary and fiscal reforms. Reforms such as removing subsidies on petroleum are politically volatile in the face of exorbitant cost of living rates. Embassy Accra reported recently that "... the government is having difficulty obtaining credit to continue the supply of crude to Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) given that TOR is unable to recover costs and service its debt. The Energy Minister said TOR loses about 6 billion cedis (\$850,000) each day, a figure that represents the gap between what it pays for crude and the revenue obtained from the below-cost pricing policy."^[11] The fact that during the recent political campaign, the former Rawlings administration promised the public an indefinite supply of petroleum at subsidized prices and was able to deliver on this promise complicates the current situation. The Kufuor government's inability to

supply adequate petroleum invites comparisons between the Rawlings and Kufuor governments -- a development the latter is eager to avoid.

The Rawlings Factor: The Kufuor government's greatest concern is whether either former President Rawlings will attempt to return to power, or Rawlings supporters in the GAF will attempt to facilitate his return by overthrowing the government. A return to power by Rawlings or pro-Rawlings elements threatens U.S. interests as it would seriously destabilize Ghana and could trigger a copycat reaction in Nigeria.

Nigeria: An implosion in Nigeria or the extension of any of the current regional crises to Ghanaian borders could draw the GOG into the conflict, prompt the amassing of refugees on Ghana's borders, and strain the domestic situation in Ghana. While Ghana is normally receptive to refugees, a large influx of Nigerian or other refugees could further strain the economy and lead to domestic unrest in Ghana.[\[12\]](#)

Assistance Issues: Clearly, the key to a successful Kufuor administration in the short-term is the reversal of current economic indices and an increase in the standard of living of ordinary Ghanaians. Embassy Accra and the USAID mission emphasized the importance of the GOG's effective handling of the economy and reported on the new president's appeal to donors for additional assistance to stabilize the economy. In a recent cable from Embassy

Accra/USAID mission, U.S. diplomats recommended strongly an increase of \$8-20 million in existing USAID Non-Project Assistance (NPA) disbursements in the current fiscal year plus an additional \$8 million in budgetary assistance. Post noted that: "Already some donors have stepped forward with help. The Dutch have released \$52 million, and the World Bank has indicated it is willing to augment this year's program by up to \$100 million. The UK (DFID) has agreed to provide a 55 million pound program, 35 million pounds of which is in budget support... The Danes and French are offering new limited amounts of budget support."[\[13\]](#)

Trans-National Issues: In terms of trans-national threats, if unabated HIV/Aids will pose a long-term threat to Ghana's population particularly women. The previous administration initiated a public education campaign. The anticipation is that the new government will continue to do the same.

Ghanaian Perspectives: Ghanaians of all political persuasions are proud of their political transition and equate this achievement to the symbolism of being the first former British colony to become independent in sub-Sahara Africa.[\[14\]](#)

Currently, there is a great sense of anticipation among the Ghanaian electorate, in spite of the deteriorating economy and many expect the new government to address vigorously the economic concerns of the ordinary citizens. The sense is that the majority of Ghanaians are willing to give the new president some room to

maneuver. However, they will not stand for any continuation of corruption and applaud Kufuor for his public anti-corruption stance.

Although Kufuor is still forming his government, early indications point to his interest in a strong bilateral relationship with Washington. He is keenly aware of the significance of an improved economy and foreign investment.[\[15\]](#)

Specifically, he appears interested in obtaining increased USG financial and technical assistance in the commercial and agricultural sectors to facilitate job creation and food self-sufficiency, in line with GOG's goal of middle-income status within the next 15-20 years.

Kufuor's apparent interest in a stronger military-to-military relationship reflects the fact that neither he nor his Vice President has a military background. Kufuor, until recently a member of Ghana's political opposition, distrusts the military and has gone so far as to appoint his brother as the Minister of Defense in a bid to keep close tabs on the military sector. President Kufuor's apprehensions reflect his desire for a strong U.S. presence in the form of exercises, military exchanges and joint operations to dissuade any notions within the GAF of a coup. The small percentage of the GOG budget apportioned to the GAF underscores the importance of a strong military-to-military relationship as a conduit for training et al.

Overall, President Kufuor envisages an enhanced bilateral relationship based on

mutual interest in strengthening domestic and regional democratic trends, regional stabilization and establishing greater commercial and trade opportunities for Ghana. It is worth noting that as Ghana's Deputy Foreign Minister during the 1970's, Kufuor knew former President Bush and anticipates developing a "special relationship" with the new Bush administration.

Objectives: "Our immediate objective is to increase the number of capable states in Africa: that is nations that are able to define the challenges they face, manage their resources, effectively address those challenges, and build security and peace within their borders and sub-regions."^[16] The new U.S. administration has yet to clarify its support for the above-mentioned agenda regarding Ghana or the region. However, in a February 7, 2001 interview, Secretary Powell said, "We cannot ignore any place in the world and Africa is a huge continent in great need. There are some pockets of success and promise such as South Africa, and Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana ..."^[17] U.S. objectives should remain centered on effective engagement with the new Ghanaian administration that is actively pro-business and pro-U.S.

Our objective should also be to cultivate a more diversified military-to-military relationship via USG regional peacekeeping and/or training programs. The GAF should be encouraged to participate actively in ACRI and, as appropriate, GAF requests regarding the level of training accommodated. The GAF's proven

expertise in peacekeeping operations makes the force a valued addition to any peacekeeping U.S. initiatives in the region. The GAF also requires offensive training to facilitate Ghana's greater participation in regional offensive operations such as Operation Force Relief.

The GOG's prioritization of the economy and commercial/trade opportunities meshes with the Bush administration's apparent interest in trade. Tools such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) augment stronger bilateral and commercial ties with potentially strong economies like Ghana. The AGOA helps to redress serious imbalances in the world market that make it prohibitive for developing economies to grow.^[18] Support of the AGOA in conjunction with debt relief and development assistance, facilitates U.S. commercial opportunities and identification of potential markets for U.S. exports, such as the 18 million households in Ghana. USG longer-term objectives should lay the groundwork for an ongoing commercial/trade partnership which will facilitate Ghana becoming a middle income country within the next 15-20 years and a major market for U.S. exports.

The GOG anticipates additional USAID and DOD funding as a "democracy dividend" of sorts, reflective of Ghana's commitment to democratization, economic reforms and the special relationship it perceives exists between Accra and Washington. However, in light of the strained economic situation, Ghana

may interpret any reluctance by Washington to augment the \$420,000 IMET program or \$52 million USAID program as a lack of USG commitment to Ghana and by extension, Africa.

Means of Influence/Instruments of Policy: Washington can draw on a number of persuasive and cooperative instruments of policy to advance U.S. interests in Ghana. The United States enjoys tremendous goodwill in Ghana evidence by the tumultuous reception for former President Clinton during his March 1998 trip to Ghana. Strong bilateral relations stem from a legacy of close diplomatic and cultural engagement. For several generations of Ghanaians, the United States is the preferred choice for higher education. Ghanaians have the largest number of students in American colleges and universities of all sub-Saharan African countries. Further, there is a strong historic and cultural bond between Ghanaians and the African-American community. As the first African country to become independent, Ghana became a symbol of the African Diaspora for many African-Americans intellectuals. Luminaries such as W.E.B. DuBois chose to work and retire in Ghana before and after Ghana's independence. The resultant strong cultural bonds have established a firm foundation for an expansive bilateral relationship.

The 1998 Presidential trip to Ghana is a prime example of a successful public diplomacy initiative. President Clinton launched his trip to the continent in

Ghana and used his visit to Accra to advance USG themes of nurturing democracy, economic prosperity, conflict resolution and ecological preservation.^[19] Former First Lady Hillary Clinton spoke on the theme of empowerment of women. She emphasized the importance of women's rights in Ghana's modern and traditional societies where the issue of child (girl) bondage remains an issue. Although this tradition is illegal, it remains prevalent in the rural areas and is a rallying point for Ghanaian and foreign human rights observers.

Public diplomacy plays a strategic role through an international visitors program that familiarizes future Ghanaian leaders with the operations of American institutions such as Congress. Visits to Accra by high-level USG officials also allow for their participation in press round tables, panels and speeches to American and local Chamber of Commerce. Ghanaian recognition of U.S. agreements and alliances such as the U.S.-Ghana Open Skies agreement of March 2000 is an important aspect of the bilateral relationship.

Foreign developmental and military assistance are major tools of statecraft in the U.S.-Ghana bilateral relationship. The \$55 million annual program is one of the largest USAID programs in Africa. DOD's IMET program serves as a major source of technological training for the GAF officer corps.^[20] The Joint Combat Exercise Training and the various ACRI initiatives all serve to augment

the existing IMET program and to cultivate a stronger military-to-military relationship with the GAF.

Strategy: The unpredictability of events in conflict-ridden West Africa over the last several years heightened the importance of the regional role played by U.S. ally Ghana. This was especially the case during the period of estranged U.S.-Nigerian relations (1993-1998). Current U.S. policy towards Ghana focuses, correctly, on the mutual bilateral interests of regional stability, democratization, economic prosperity and support for trans-national/global issues. U.S. strategy in Ghana, however, must take into greater consideration the overarching regional interest of the United States -- the political stabilization and democratic development of Ghana's giant oil producing neighbor Nigeria. The Department of State's identification of Nigeria as one of four "priority nations" worldwide, necessarily affects the scope of U.S. policy towards Ghana. In an environment of constrained funding for State Department, we should avoid putting of all of our proverbial eggs "into one basket," i.e., Nigeria. In short, while a critical regional priority, the development of a strategy for Nigeria should not come at the expense of U.S. engagement with an important friend and resource such as Ghana. This consideration is particularly relevant regarding military-training programs. The focus needs to be on Nigeria and Ghana. In Ghana, new and ongoing U.S. training programs should complement each other

and, as appropriate, work with Ghanaian and/or ECOWAS initiatives. Operation Focus Relief, a U.S. trained West African force in UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) is the type of initiative that could facilitate such regional coordination.

A strategic framework for Ghana must also concentrate on addressing the biggest challenge facing the GOG – economic resurgence and credible job creation. The reversal of deteriorating economic trends will help to strengthen Ghana’s democratic mandate and empower the country economically. Certainly, the U.S. can work more closely with Ghana’s new pro-business administration on more innovative, integrated approach to investment, debt relief and trade. What many Africanists and developmental economists underscore, however, is “Achieving economic development through exports and foreign investment is problematic in much of Africa, where infrastructure and social services have deteriorated following IMF/World Bank-mandated government spending cuts.”

[\[21\]](#) This is a valid criticism and emphasizes the need for continued development assistance and infra-structural support to address the deterioration of critical education, health, and general social services. Vehicles like the AGOA, programs such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, address only some of the commercial/economic constraints. Targeted development assistance programs are the third part of this formula. Ghana has made the strategic decision not to participate in the HIPC to preserve the country’s credit

rating. [22] The development of credible programs to engage women in a variety of educational, commercial and agricultural projects is critical in a country like Ghana. Ghana, a regional leader in education, has with a cadre of highly educated, professional and entrepreneurial women within the socio-political elite and urbanized middle classes. Similar opportunities for women and girls in the rural areas are a prerequisite for Ghana becoming a middle-income country in a generation. “Policy makers must devote explicit attention to the gender impact of new initiatives. Women, as entrepreneurs, and farmers, constitute the economic backbone of many rural African communities. But policies designed to stimulate economic growth typically ignore women’s differential access to land, credit, training and technical assistance.” [23]

Ultimately, U.S. strategy for Ghana should help facilitate the development of an economically competitive African democracy and long-term ally of Washington, capable of contributing independently to the regional stability, democratic development, and economic prosperity of West Africa. To do so requires the USG’s development of a strategic long-term policy for the region and Africa at large – an exercise not yet undertaken.

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The Challenge of Ghana – A Strategic Review of the Bilateral Relationship
RSS Questions

The Bilateral Relationship (U.S-Ghana):

- *U.S. policy towards Africa is often described as crisis oriented, short-termed, and rhetoric-driven. Example - the recentUSG focus on privatization/investment vice traditional development assistance has been criticized by developmental economists as shortsighted and concentrated on assisting elites not the grassroots., USG Please comment.*
- *What are Government of Ghana's (GOG) perspectives on the bilateral relationship and what are Ghana's specific interests regarding the United States?*

- *Does the GOG agree with U.S. stated interests in Ghana/Africa?*
- *Trade/Investment appear to be major common interests between the GOG and the USG. In light of the passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, will Ghana push for the formation of a Bilateral Trade Commission (similar to the successful U.S.-Republic of South Africa BNC).*
- *When does President Kufuor hope to visit WDC? Will Congress be on the agenda? Is there a Ghanaian-American lobby – given number of Ghanaian professionals in the United States. Would you encourage the development of one (given impact of Indian-American lobby etc.)*
- *As you know, Former Secretary of State identified Nigeria as a “Priority Country” in 1998/99. Does the GOG see any implications for the U.S.-Ghanaian bilateral relationship?*

The GOG:

- *Professor George Ayittey(Ghanaian born professor of economics at American University) a longtime critic of developments in Africa, welcomed the election of President Kufuor. Professor Ayittey also commented that “thousands of millions of dollars have been wasted on ineffectual aid programs for Africa,” and suggested that the focus should be on aiding grassroots civic organizations and political movements. Please comment.*
- *What are the real expectations of the Ghanaian public regarding President Kufuor’s election? How much room will they give the GOG to maneuver – specifically regarding removal of petroleum subsidies?*
- *Ghana has thousands of well-qualified, professional Ghanaians living in the UK, U.S. and Australia. How does the GOG see their role?*
- *Who makes up the GOG’s political base? What percentage of the Ghanaian electorate does this base constitute? If this political core supports*

GOG initiatives such as fiscal/monetary reform, can the GOG implement these difficult policies or will the Kufuor government need additional political support?

- *Neither President Kufuor nor his Vice President has a military background. How important is it for them to cultivate strong relations with the GAF. How does the GOG see the GAF's role?*

The Economy:

- *The economy is the greatest challenge facing the Kufuor administration. What are the GOG's priorities given the deteriorating economy?*
- *Ghana has declined using the HIPC in order to preserve its credit rating with the IFIs. How successful is this strategy?*
- *Can you comment on the GOG's plans for the Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) given its ongoing losses and daily cost to the GOG?*
- *To what extent is the public aware of the cost of subsidization? Would the public support a partial reduction in subsidies in light of the costs to the economy?*

Role of Regional Organizations:

- *What is the GOG's view of the Economic Community of West Africa's (ECOWAS) role regionally, re the civil war in Sierra Leone and the coup in Cote d'Ivoire?*
- *What is ECOWAS' role vis-à-vis the Organization of African Unity? Regionally and continent-wide.*
- *In the GOG perspective, how does ECOWAS' role compare with the South*

African Development Corporation (SADC), and the East African Community (EAC)?

Nigeria:

- *President Obasanjo attended President Kufuor's inauguration and spoke about stronger Nigerian-Ghanaian relations/cooperation. Please comment.*
- *Nigeria is the regional hegemon due to its size, resources, army. What is Ghana's role in this equation?*
- *What is the status of the proposed gas pipeline from Nigeria to Ghana?*

[1] U.S. Embassy Accra unclassified cable (Accra 169), 22 January 2001: 1.

[2] U.S. Embassy Accra unclassified cable (Accra 432), 16 February 2001: 1.

[3] Reuters, Accra, Ghana, January 2001.

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